Did the Pentagon really plan fake attacks to start a war?
The Joint Chiefs’ own 1962 memo proposes staged attacks to justify invading Cuba. No record read shows any of them was carried out, or that a later war was started the same way on purpose.
- ✓ Confirmed13 Mar 1962What the list proposes: staged attacks on Americans and others, blamed on Cuba
- Likely1962The plan is not adopted
- UnverifiedTheoryThe attack was staged or invented on purpose, as Northwoods proposed
In March 1962 the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent the Secretary of Defense a list of staged attacks that could be blamed on Cuba to justify an invasion.
The question What did the Joint Chiefs propose in 1962, and was any of it ever done?
What the records say
The documented story holds up: 9 of 11 timeline steps are Confirmed by the records (score 95).
3 theories checked: 3 unverified. A theory is rated by its key claim.
James Bamford’s book brings Northwoods to wide attention
confirmedCredible: two independent tier-2 reports. See the step
Down the rabbit hole
The ground line is the documented timeline. Each tunnel is a theory that branches off it; every chamber is a step, coloured by how well the records support it. The deepest chamber is the theory’s key claim. Tap one to open it.
Main timeline
Oldest first- 5 Mar 1962confirmed
The head of the Cuba Project asks the Joint Chiefs for pretexts to invade Cuba
A memo from the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, subject “Operation MONGOOSE”, asked for a “brief but precise description of pretexts” that would justify US military intervention in Cuba. The State Department’s history names General Lansdale as chief of operations.
T1Joint Chiefs memo, 13 Mar 1962pp. 2, 4–5involved party: US government (the Joint Chiefs of Staff)T1State Department history, FRUS 1961–63 vol. X, doc. 314doc. 314, para. 4involved party: US government (the administration whose Cuba policy is in question) - 7 Mar 1962confirmed
The Joint Chiefs say a Cuban “provocation” may have to be developed
They wrote that if a credible revolt inside Cuba could not be achieved in the next 9–10 months, the United States would need to decide “to develop a Cuban ‘provocation’ as justification for positive US military action.”
T1Joint Chiefs memo, 13 Mar 1962p. 12 (Enclosure B)involved party: US government (the Joint Chiefs of Staff) - 8–12 Mar 1962confirmed
The pretext list is drafted and goes to the Joint Chiefs under the code name NORTHWOODS
The Navy proposed “Instances to Provoke Military Actions in Cuba” on 8 March. A report dated 9 March went to the Joint Chiefs, and a note of 12 March submits it “on NORTHWOODS”.
T1Joint Chiefs memo, 13 Mar 1962unnumbered notes; p. 2, footnoteinvolved party: US government (the Joint Chiefs of Staff)T1National Archives record form, JFK Collection - 13 Mar 1962confirmed
The Joint Chiefs approve it and send it to the Secretary of Defense
At their meeting on 13 March the Joint Chiefs approved the recommendations, and General Lemnitzer, their chairman, forwarded the memo to Robert McNamara as “a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes”. It asked that the Joint Chiefs run both overt and covert military operations.
T1Joint Chiefs memo, 13 Mar 1962cover memo; decision note; pp. 3, 6involved party: US government (the Joint Chiefs of Staff)T2ABC News, 1 May 2001 - 13 Mar 1962confirmed
What the list proposes: staged attacks on Americans and others, blamed on Cuba
It includes friendly Cubans staging an attack on Guantanamo, “We could blow up a US ship in Guantanamo Bay and blame Cuba”, a terror campaign “in the Miami area, in other Florida cities and even in Washington”, sinking a boat of Cuban refugees “(real or simulated)”, and swapping a charter airliner for a drone to fake its shoot-down.
T1Joint Chiefs memo, 13 Mar 1962pp. 7–11involved party: US government (the Joint Chiefs of Staff)T2National Security Archive, 30 Apr 2001 - 14 Mar 1962confirmed
Operation Mongoose’s guidelines assume a US invasion and resources to “justify” it
The guidelines say final success “will require decisive U.S. military intervention” and that resources developed inside Cuba “will be used to prepare for and justify this intervention”. The Joint Chiefs were to keep planning for it.
T1State Department history, FRUS 1961–63 vol. X, doc. 314doc. 314, paras 1–2involved party: US government (the administration whose Cuba policy is in question) - 16 Mar 1962likely
President Kennedy doubts that overt military force will be justified
A note by U. Alexis Johnson records that the President, with General Lemnitzer present, expressed “skepticism” that circumstances would arise to justify using American forces, and that no decision approving it was “expressed or implied”. Contingency planning would go on. The note does not mention Northwoods by name.
T1State Department history, FRUS 1961–63 vol. X, doc. 314doc. 314, source noteinvolved party: US government (the administration whose Cuba policy is in question) - 1962likely
The plan is not adopted
ABC News, reporting on the documents in 2001, said the plans “apparently were rejected by the civilian leadership”. No record of the rejection itself was read for this case.
- 1974confirmed
The Joint Chiefs’ meeting minutes from 1947 to 1978 are destroyed
The Joint Staff told the Assassination Records Review Board that in 1974 the Secretary for the Joint Chiefs ordered the minutes and transcripts destroyed. The Board noted they would have included minutes from 1963 and 1964.
T1Review Board final report, 1998p. 159 - 1997confirmed
The Northwoods file is reviewed for release in the JFK records
The National Archives’ record form lists a 197-page JCS file named NORTHWOODS, “released with deletions”, last reviewed on 7 Oct 1997. On 18 Nov 1997 the Archives released 84 Joint Chiefs and Army documents on Cuba policy, 1962–64, about 1,500 pages, found by the Review Board. The press release does not name Northwoods.
- 30 Apr 2001confirmed
James Bamford’s book brings Northwoods to wide attention
Bamford’s “Body of Secrets” described the plan, and the National Security Archive posted the memo. ABC News quoted him: “The reason these were held secret for so long is the Joint Chiefs never wanted to give these up because they were so embarrassing”.
Branches
Go down oneA branch is only as strong as its weakest step so far. The count is how many sources back each step.
A Northwoods-style pretext carried out later
Was a war later started on a pretext the way Northwoods proposed?
The journalist I. F. Stone questioned the second attack “only weeks after the events”, the National Security Archive notes. The link to Northwoods could only be made after its release in 1997.
- 321,920 YouTube views, “TRUTH about the Gulf of Tonkin Incident” (Forgotten History) as of 17 Oct 2026 T3YouTube: Forgotten History on Tonkin
- 121,389 YouTube views, “The Gulf of Tonkin Cover-Up That Fueled Vietnam” (Historigraph) as of 17 Oct 2026 T3YouTube: Historigraph on Tonkin
- 3,735 YouTube views, “The Gulf of Tonkin Incident In Vietnam Was A False Flag Operation” as of 17 Oct 2026 T4YouTube: “Tonkin ... False Flag”
The military had already written pretext plans
Northwoods is cited as proof that such plans were on the table two years earlier.
The premise: confirmedTrue. The Joint Chiefs approved a list of staged incidents in March 1962. That shows intent in 1962, not what happened in 1964.
T1Joint Chiefs memo, 13 Mar 1962pp. 7–11involved party: US government (the Joint Chiefs of Staff)The second Tonkin attack never happened
Videos call Tonkin a “cover-up” and a “false flag”.
The premise: confirmedTrue, by the NSA’s own history: “no attack happened that night.”
T1NSA historian Hanyok, released 2005p. 3involved party: US government (the National Security Agency)T2National Security Archive, 1 Dec 2005The evidence was shaped to fit the story
Proponents say officials made the intelligence say what they needed.
The premise: confirmedHanyok found “an active effort to make SIGINT fit the claim”, as the Archive quotes him. He also found no “smoking gun” of a cover-up.
T2National Security Archive, 1 Dec 2005T1NSA historian Hanyok, released 2005p. 3involved party: US government (the National Security Agency)
- confirmed
The 4 August 1964 attack in the Gulf of Tonkin did not happen, the NSA’s own historian found
Hanyok wrote that “no attack happened that night” and that North Vietnam’s navy was salvaging two boats damaged on 2 August. The article was declassified in 2005.
T1NSA historian Hanyok, released 2005p. 3involved party: US government (the National Security Agency)T2National Security Archive, 1 Dec 2005StartStrength so far:confirmed· 2 sources on this step - confirmed
The intelligence given to the White House was skewed toward an attack
Hanyok found that nearly 90 percent of the relevant intercepts were left out of NSA’s reports, and that only intelligence supporting the attack claim reached officials.
T1NSA historian Hanyok, released 2005p. 3involved party: US government (the National Security Agency)T2National Security Archive, 1 Dec 2005= HoldsStrength so far:confirmed· 2 sources on this step - confirmed
The claim was used for air strikes and a congressional resolution
Hanyok wrote that it is “difficult to imagine” the 5 August air strikes being ordered without the intercept “evidence”. The National Security Archive notes the claim also backed the request for a congressional resolution.
T1NSA historian Hanyok, released 2005p. 2involved party: US government (the National Security Agency)T2National Security Archive, 1 Dec 2005= HoldsStrength so far:confirmed· 2 sources on this step - unverified
Key claim: the attack was staged or invented on purpose, as Northwoods proposed
No record read shows a plan to fake the incident. Hanyok says the mishandling was “not done in a manner that can be construed as conspiratorial”, but that is the NSA’s own historian, so it cannot disprove the claim.
T1NSA historian Hanyok, released 2005p. 3involved party: US government (the National Security Agency)▼ WeakerStrength so far:unverified· 1 source on this step
Bullshit meter
- Key claim: the attack was staged or invented on purpose, as Northwoods proposed. Unverified.
- Key claim contradicted by tier 1? Not by an independent record. The attack did not happen and the intelligence was skewed, but no record read shows it was staged; the only denial of intent is the NSA’s own.
Fluff meter: possibly planted
- Can’t be traced to an original record. Absent: the non-attack traces to the NSA’s own declassified history.
- First appeared from new or anonymous accounts. Not measured.
- Coordinated identical wording. Not measured.
- Cited source doesn’t exist. Absent.
- Later contradicted. Not measured.
● present · ○ absent · – not measured. Lists signals only. It never accuses anyone.
Personal interest meter
- Robert J. Hanyok, wrote as an NSA historian about the agency’s own reporting. T1NSA historian Hanyok, released 2005p. 3involved party: US government (the National Security Agency)
“Has a documented interest” only, each one sourced. Never an implication of guilt.
Correlation meter
- General Lyman Lemnitzer, signs the Northwoods memo (main timeline) and attends the 16 March meeting (Kennedy branch). T1Joint Chiefs memo, 13 Mar 1962cover memoinvolved party: US government (the Joint Chiefs of Staff)
- Records destroyed in 1974, bear on the 9/11 and Kennedy branches, and on the Kennedy assassination case in this collection. T1Review Board final report, 1998p. 159
- Destroyed records, again, The CIA destroyed its MKULTRA files in 1973 (see the MKUltra case); the Joint Chiefs destroyed their minutes in 1974. T1Review Board final report, 1998p. 159
Links to other cases appear once those cases exist.
Who worked on this
This case was assembled by the site from public records. Contributions are not open yet. Nothing here is invented, so the counts are zero.
This is the first published version of the case.
Sources
- T1involved party: US government (the Joint Chiefs of Staff) Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, “Justification for US Military Intervention in Cuba (TS)”, signed L. L. Lemnitzer for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 13 Mar 1962, with the note on NORTHWOODS (JCS 1969/321, 12 Mar 1962), the decision note, the 9 Mar 1962 report and its enclosures and annex, 15 pp. Page numbers are the memo’s own (2–12); the cover memo and notes are unnumbered.. nsarchive2.gwu.edu
- T1National Archives record identification form for JFK Collection record 202-10002-10104, “NORTHWOODS” (JCS, 197 pages, JCS Central Files 1962, Box 29), enclosed with a National Archives FOIA reply of 7 Mar 2013 (case 39655). www.archives.gov · copy read: documents3.theblackvault.com
- T1“National Archives Releases Additional Materials Reviewed by the Assassination Records Review Board”, National Archives press release, 17 Nov 1997. www.archives.gov
- T1Final Report of the Assassination Records Review Board, September 1998 (page numbers from the report’s own contents list). www.archives.gov
- T1involved party: US government (the administration whose Cuba policy is in question) Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume X, Cuba, Document 314, “Guidelines for Operation Mongoose”, 14 Mar 1962, with the editors’ source note quoting U. Alexis Johnson’s handwritten note of 16 Mar 1962 (Office of the Historian, Department of State). history.state.gov
- T2David Ruppe, “U.S. Military Wanted to Provoke War With Cuba”, ABC News, dated 30 Apr / 1 May 2001. abcnews.go.com
- T2“Pentagon Proposed Pretexts for Cuba Invasion in 1962”, National Security Archive, George Washington University, 30 Apr 2001. nsarchive2.gwu.edu
- T1involved party: US government (the National Security Agency) Robert J. Hanyok, “Skunks, Bogies, Silent Hounds, and the Flying Fish: The Gulf of Tonkin Mystery, 2–4 August 1964”, Cryptologic Quarterly (NSA), approved for release by NSA on 3 Nov 2005, FOIA case 43933; the journal says its articles are the author’s views, not the agency’s. nsarchive2.gwu.edu
- T2“Tonkin Gulf Intelligence ‘Skewed’ According to Official History and Intercepts”, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 132, update of 1 Dec 2005, George Washington University. nsarchive2.gwu.edu
- T2“Excerpts: Bin Laden video”, BBC News, last updated 29 Oct 2004. news.bbc.co.uk
- T2“Full transcript of bin Ladin’s speech”, Al Jazeera, 1 Nov 2004. www.aljazeera.com
- T3Jared Israel, “Northwoods: A Plan for Terror to Justify War”, Emperor’s Clothes, posted 10 Dec 2001, as republished by Scoop (NZ), 12 Dec 2001 (the claimant’s own article). www.scoop.co.nz
- T3Jacob G. Hornberger, “Operation Northwoods and the 9/11 Truthers”, The Future of Freedom Foundation, 17 Sep 2009 (commentary). www.fff.org
- T3“TRUTH about the Gulf of Tonkin Incident - Forgotten History”, FORGOTTEN HISTORY, YouTube, 3 Jan 2024. www.youtube.com
- T3“The Gulf of Tonkin Cover-Up That Fueled Vietnam”, Historigraph, YouTube, 26 Nov 2024. www.youtube.com
- T4“The Gulf of Tonkin Incident In Vietnam Was A False Flag Operation”, FederalJacktube6, YouTube, 14 Sep 2011. www.youtube.com
- T4“9/11 & Operation Northwoods - Why the US Is Willing to SLAUGHTER Its Own Citizens”, 2eelShmeal, YouTube, 11 Sep 2013. www.youtube.com
- T3“Jesse Ventura and Judge Napolitano Talk Operation Northwoods, 9/11, and Wikileaks”, Freedom Watch excerpt (6 Apr 2011), Original1001BG, YouTube. www.youtube.com
- T3“Operation Northwoods: Blueprint Of 9/11”, The Mike Malloy Youtube Channel, YouTube, 16 Sep 2010. www.youtube.com
- T3“Operation Mongoose & Operation Northwoods: The Plot That Turned Back on the President”, History & Organised Crime, YouTube, 4 Nov 2025. www.youtube.com
- T3“Operation Northwoods: JFK Stopped This Nightmare Before It Started”, Proven Conspiracies, YouTube, 31 Aug 2024. www.youtube.com